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1. Disagreement and dialogue types 
 
The paper addresses a very interesting and potentially controversial issue, namely the 
relationship between disagreements and dialogue shifts. The author advances the claim that 
negotiation is an instrument for managing disagreements, provided that two conditions apply:  
 
1. the disagreement must be practical rather than theoretical; and  
2. the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice in order to arrive at a compromise, more 
specifically, they must be willing to sacrifice their epistemic goal in favor of their social 
goal.  
´ 
The author, thus, conceives the “negotiation of disagreements is a type of practical 
argumentation.” Like in practical argumentation, the author argues, the parties are making a 
decision in order to achieve the most satisfying (the best) result, in disagreements different 
considerations are assessed in order to end the discussion and reach an agreement – which can 
be based not on the “absolute” best, but on the relative one.  
The author’s argumentation is based on Walton’s (among many others’) distinction 
between “practical” and “theoretical” disagreements, which is in turn grounded on the classical 
theoretical vs. practical nature of a claim (or even knowledge Ryle 1949). However, as the 
author points out, this distinction can be problematic when we try to determine the conditions 
of the shift to a negotiation dialogue. The author points out that, while theoretical 
disagreements cannot be shifted to negotiation, practical ones can (p. 5), as the commitments 
and more importantly the relationship between the parties’ commitments are different in the 
two cases. In theoretical disagreements, the parties have clashing commitments over the truth 
(or rather, in argumentation, the “acceptability”) of a viewpoint, while in practical ones their 
clash concerns the commitments to the desirability of a state of affairs or an action.  
 However, the author underscores that this view hides some essential aspects of practical 
disagreements. The first dimension concerns the type of commitments that the parties have, as 
a practical disagreement is characterized, according to the author, by four conditions: (1) two 
or more parties have desires over a state of affairs; (2) those desires are clashing with each 
other; (3) the parties have agency over the desired state of affairs, and (4) the parties are willing 
or forced to act upon the desired state of affairs. The second dimension is the cognitive and 
evaluative dimension of a practical decision (and thus a practical disagreement). As the whole 
Aristotelian tradition underscores, from Book 2 and 3 of Aristotle’s Topics to the approaches 
to decision-making in the medieval time – for a review, see (Macagno and Walton 2018) – 
practical reasoning (a term that can be taken to include the two schemes of argument from 
consequences and from practical reasoning) presupposes an evaluation of a state of affairs 
(based on heuristics) (von Wright 1963). More importantly, any decision-making presupposes 
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a definition – or “classification” – of the state of affairs that is intended to be changed (Schiappa 
2003). Thus, as the author underlines, practical disagreements (such as disagreements about 
policies) can presuppose differences in how a state of affairs is evaluated or classified, making 
the distinction between negotiation and persuasion sometimes hard to trace (for the same point, 
see Provis 2004).  
  The author’s contribution is to take into account the social dimension of argumentation, 
where not only the “truth” is considered (whatever it means), but more importantly the “social 
goal” of argumentation, the “costs and dangers” of not reaching an agreement from the point 
of view of the relationship and the arguer’s ethos. Thus, negotiation is regarded as a tool for 
reaching a view that is good enough for both speakers – a tradeoff, which can be both of desires, 
or evaluations or even a description of a state of affairs. The author then redefines negotiation 
as a “type of practical argumentation were the parties adjust their goals or their means-goal 
relationship, in accordance with the social situation,” and concludes that disagreement 
management is a type of negotiation, and this type of negotiation is a form of practical 
argumentation.   
 
2. The meaning of negotiation 
 
The contribution of this paper is grounded on some basic concepts: “negotiation,” “practical 
argumentation,” and “persuasion.” The author considers them from a dialectical perspective; 
thus, the basic reference is the set of works that defined them in the first place. In argumentation 
theory, the notion of negotiation has been introduced as a type of dialogue, and more 
importantly as a type of dialogue that has some defining features that distinguish it from other 
types of dialogue (D. Walton 1989).  
The first crucial aspect is the notion of dialogue, defined based on three criteria: two or 
more participants, speech acts (or dialogue acts) exchanged, and the interconnection between 
them (relevance) (D. Walton 1989, 1, 2004, 1999, 36). Thus, since negotiation is a type of 
dialogue (an activity), the generic category under which the author claims to classify it needs 
to be a type of dialogue. Therefore, it is possible to infer that “practical argumentation” is for 
the author a dialogue, or more precisely a dialogue type with characteristics that are broader 
than negotiation. This claim cannot be taken for granted, as the tradition seems to maintain a 
very different view. Practical arguments have been traditionally seen as arguments, namely 
instruments aimed at addressing a doubt or a difference based on a premises that, through a 
rule of inference (a topos or locus), increase the acceptability of the conclusion (D. Walton 
1990). The modern approaches to practical reasoning are compatible with the concept of 
practical arguments, but apart from the pragmatic goal of pursuing a goal that is related to a 
dialogical context, an argument cannot be confused with a dialogue. The author uses the term 
“practical argumentation” but since it cannot be the same as practical argument or practical 
reasoning, one is left with the question of what the author means with this phrase. The best 
candidate is “deliberation,” whose relationship with persuasion, value reasoning, classification, 
and negotiation has been thoroughly explored by Walton (for the latest developments, see D. 
Walton and Toniolo 2016; D. Walton, Toniolo, and Norman 2014, 2016).  
However, the author seems to have something else in mind when he cites a “practical 
argumentation” structure. The idea the author uses is a refinement of a structure presented in 
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012), which is just an adaptation of Walton’s practical reasoning 
and its interrelation with the argument from values and classification (Bench-Capon 2003; 
Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007; Atkinson, Bench-Capon, and McBurney 2006). Despite its 
different name, “practical argumentation” as shown is nothing else than a practical argument, 
whose inferential relations are not modeled nor explained as all the literature on this topic does 
instead. In the literature, the notion of “best” outcome has never been considered as an 
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“absolute” perfection of means; rather, Walton and the other authors who worked on this issue 
pointed out the relative nature of the “best” means, namely the most acceptable means given 
the values and the conditions. In this sense, I do not see anything new in the scheme the author 
proposes – just a less specific description of what has been done before. Moreover, considering 
that this is the understanding of “practical reasoning,” I cannot see how a type of dialogue can 
be a type of argument. Simply, the two constructs are not comparable – arguments can be used 
in a dialogue, but surely an argument is not a type of dialogue.  
The second dimension of negotiation is its features. The notion of negotiation described 
by Walton is defined based on three dimensions: an initial situation, the participant’s goal, and 
the goal of the dialogue. Negotiation is thus defined in contrast with both deliberation and 
persuasion as follows (D. Walton 2006, 183, 1989, 8):  
 
Type of Dialogue Initial Situation Participant’s Goal Goal of The Dialogue 
Negotiation  
 
Conflict of 
interests 
Get what you most 
want 
Reasonable settlement 
that both can live with 
Persuasion Conflict of 
opinions  
Persuade other party Resolve or clarify issue 
 
Deliberation  Dilemma or 
practical choice 
Co-ordinate goals and 
actions 
Decide best available 
course of action 
 
Negotiation and deliberation have very different starting points: while deliberation stems from 
a practical choice, and more importantly a need of coordination of the interlocutors’ actions to 
pursue a goal that is shared (at different levels and stages), negotiation starts from a personal 
goal that is in conflict with another’s. Walton’s account is grounded on the concept of 
negotiation commonly used in negotiation theory (R. Walton and McKersie 1965, 2–3), in 
which four subtypes are distinguished: Distributive bargaining (zero-sum game), Integrative 
bargaining (positive-sum game), Attitudinal structuring (managing the relationship between 
the participants), and Intraorganizational bargaining (bringing the expectations of one side of 
a wider negotiation process into alignment) (see Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1981). Now, these four 
types involve making decisions – integrative and distributive bargaining are acknowledged by 
Walton and McKersie as types of joint decision-making processes. However, they are not 
deliberation dialogues in the sense of Walton’s dialogue types, as what is in common in 
distributive bargaining is very little – the rules of a game in some cases – and certainly not the 
goal intended as the participants’ goal.  
 The author illustrates his point with the following example:  
 
Party A and Party B disagree about the level of renewable energy that should be 
used by 2020. Party A proposes a 18% and party B a 14%. After trying to persuade 
each other providing several reasons they arrive at a stalemate:  no party has been 
able to persuade the other. Therefore, they decide to split the difference at 16%. 
 
Clearly, without the overall dialogue, it is almost impossible to analyze this case. However, 
some questions can be raised. The author analyzes it as a two-step dialogical process: first, the 
parties engage in a persuasion dialogue, and second, they start a negotiation. The crucial 
questions is the following: why is this a type of negotiation? According to Walton’s types of 
dialogue, it fails to fulfill the conflict of interests – and goals – as both parties are just trying to 
make a joint decision on what both needs to achieve. Is it a bargaining? If this is a discussion 
of a policy, it seems that the parties are not trying to get what they want, but to make a decision 
(using practical reasoning arguments) that takes into account not only the positive 
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consequences of getting the “best” gas reduction, but also the negative one of not getting to a 
gas reduction soon enough, etc. Also, the personal relationship can be accounted in this model. 
Going back to the standard model of practical reasoning (D. Walton 2007), the parties are just 
making a joint decision evaluating the alternatives.  
 Walton indicated as a criterion (the “test”) for distinguishing negotiation from other 
types of dialogue the possibility of threats, which are allowed and indeed common in 
negotiations, but fallacious tactics in other types of dialogue. Clearly, without a context it is 
impossible to analyze this case. The author, however, should see whether threats would be 
allowed in this circumstance (“if you do not lower more the emissions, I will block your 
proposal in the commission”). If this is the case, why using persuasion in the first place? 
Similarly, other cases (such as the restaurant case) seem to be clear cases of deliberation, where 
the participants have a common interest and common goals, and they at a certain point can shift 
to negotiation if their interest collide. The context, however, does not allow understand why 
these cases are negotiation, as it is unclear how the dialogue is developed and why the interest 
are in conflict.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the author intends to classify disagreement management as a type of negotiation, 
as negotiation is a type of practical argumentation. The concepts used, however, are ill defined, 
and the notion of practical argumentation mentioned is at best confusing. If we define the terms 
used, we can see how deliberation and negotiation are distinct types of dialogue. If we regard 
practical reasoning arguments as arguments, we can see how the conclusion that a certain 
course of actions is more preferable than another is the result of different types of 
considerations, without redefining activities that imply dialogical settings, roles, attitudes, and 
rules that are different. This leads to wonder whether it is possible to explain the examples as 
different uses of practical reasoning arguments. If we go back to the examples presented by the 
author, this possibility cannot be excluded. While dialectical shifts are common, it is risky to 
claim that negotiation is a type of deliberation, as the dialectical roles of the participants are 
redefined in this shift, allowing types of dialogical and dialectical behaviors that would not be 
possible in deliberation or persuasion dialogue. The risk is to redefine a concept without any 
need, and to multiply theoretical constructs.  
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